Legal practitioners Nicol-Wilson & Co. have challenged the validity of the purported passage of the 1991 Constitution (Amendment) Bill 2025, arguing that Parliament failed to secure the constitutionally required two-thirds majority.
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NICOL-WILSON & CO
MALAIKA CHAMBERS
Legal Consultants, Barristers and Solicitors of the High Court of Sierra Leone
17 Off Kingharman Road, Freetown
18th August, 2026THE HONOURABLE SPEAKER OF PARLIAMENT
OAU DRIVE
TOWER HILL
FREETOWN
Dear Honourable Speaker,
RE: THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, THE POWERS OF THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NON-APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 94 (2) OF THE 1991 CONSTITUTION IN RELATION TO EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS
We write in the public interest and with grave concern regarding the procedure adopted and the provisions of law invoked to amend a section of the 1991 Constitution when the 1991 Constitution (Amendment) Bill 2025 was going through the various stages of Parliament, at the Parliamentary sitting on the 10th day of August 2026.
It appears that the aforementioned Bill inter alia seeks, to amend the presidential electoral threshold prescribed by section 42(2)(e) of the Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991 (Act No. 6 of 1991), from fifty-five per cent (55%) of the valid votes cast to fifty percent plus one (50% + 1).
Our concerns mirror that of other legal practitioners and jurists who have in various publications and other media outlets unequivocally expressed dissatisfaction about the referenced parliamentary sitting.
Furthermore, it is unassailable that prior to the Parliamentary voting on the 10th August 2026, all the attending members of the All People Congress save for two, withdrew from the parliamentary deliberations amidst concerns of the ensuing incongruousness.
THE 1991 Constitution
The 1991 Constitution of Sierra Leone, is the supreme law of the Republic (Constitutio est suprema lex) and that Parliament must use proper legal paths- and cannot use unlawful, extra-constitutional, or abusive methods-to change the constitution, as that will amount to unconstitutional constitutional amendment. Its provisions bind every institution of State, including Parliament and the Office of the Speaker.
The safeguards prescribed for constitutional amendment are not matters of parliamentary convenience or internal procedure. They are mandatory constitutional conditions which determine whether Parliament has validly exercised the power to alter the supreme law.
Alteration of the 1991 Constitution
The Non-Applicability of Section 91 (1)
We are reliably informed that during the sitting on the 10th of August you wrongly directed the members of Parliament that the provisions of Section 91 (1) is the applicable law for voting on the constitutional amendment sort.
For ease of reference Section 91 (1) deals with voting in parliament on matters not relating to alteration of the Constitution and provides as follows:
”Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, any question proposed for decision in Parliament shall be determined by a majority of the votes of the Members present and voting.”
Of particular concern is the sequence adopted following your decision. The Bill was permitted to proceed upon your interpretation of the constitutional threshold, the vote was taken and the Bill was purportedly passed.
The Alteration of the 1991 Constitution
The Applicability of Section 108 (2) (b)
Mr. Speaker the applicable provision of the Constitution for alteration of the Non-Entrenched Clauses of the Constitution is Section 108 (2) (b) which deals with alteration of the 1991 Constitution and provides as follows:
Section 108 (1) “subject to the provisions of this section Parliament may alter this constitution.”
(2)” A Bill for an Act of Parliament under this section shall not be passed by parliament unless
(b) ‘the Bill is supported on the second and third readings by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the Members of Parliament.”
Emanating from the above,
it is obvious that the required Constitutional threshold of “not less than two-thirds of the members of parliament” was not satisfied at the sitting on the 10th day of August 2026.
Distinction between Section 91 (1) and Section 108 (2) (b)
Mr. Speaker, the distinction between these provisions is clear and not in dispute. Section 91(1) establishes the general rule governing ordinary parliamentary decisions whereas Section 108(2)(b) establishes the special and more exacting constitutional threshold governing amendments to the Constitution. Indeed, section 91(1) expressly subjects itself to provisions such as section 108 by beginning with the words, ”Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution.” Section 108(2)(b) is precisely such an exception.
On a literal construction, section 108(2)(b) could scarcely be clearer. It requires “not less than two-thirds of the Members of Parliament.” It does not say “two-thirds of the Members present” or “two-thirds of the Members present and voting.”
Significantly, the latter expression appears expressly in section 91(1).
The framers therefore knew precisely how to prescribe a threshold based upon Members present and voting when that was their intention. Their deliberate use of different language in section 108(2)(b) must necessarily be accorded a different meaning.
That construction accords with the literal rule expressed in R v Judge of the City of London Court [1892] 1 QB 273 and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone in Alhaji Sam Sumana v Attorney-General & Minister of Justice and Victor Foh (SC 4 of 2015) (unreported) in which it was stated that ‘Where constitutional language is clear and unambiguous, effect must be given to the ordinary meaning of the words employed’. There is, respectfully, no textual basis upon which the words “present and voting” can properly be imported into section 108(2)(b).
In the case of S V ZUMA (1995) the South African Constitutional Court stated that ‘a Constitution is a Legal Instrument, the language of which must be respected’.
The latin maxim’ generalia specialibus non derogant’ (Special Things derogates from General Things) leads to the same conclusion. Section 91(1) is the general provision governing parliamentary voting; section 108(2)(b) is the special provision governing constitutional amendment. The special provision must prevail over the general, particularly where the general provision itself expressly acknowledges that it operates only “except as otherwise provided in this Constitution.”
Even using the purposive approach to Constitutional Interpretation will produces precisely the same result, as recognized in Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher [1980] AC 319 where it was stated that ‘constitutional provisions must be interpreted generously and purposively so as to give effect to the object for which they were enacted’. The evident purpose of section 108 is constitutional alteration. It exists to ensure that the fundamental law cannot be altered merely because a Government commands an ordinary majority amongst those Members who happen to be present on a particular day.
To interpret section 108(2)(b) as requiring two-thirds only of Members present would not merely strain its language; it would defeat its very purpose. The constitutional threshold would fluctuate according to attendance, and the protection deliberately created by section 108 would become progressively weaker as fewer Members attended Parliament. Such an interpretation would turn the protective purpose of section 108 on its head.
Thus, whether approached literally or purposively, the conclusion is the same: section 91(1) cannot lawfully be invoked to reduce, qualify or displace the special threshold expressly prescribed by section 108(2)(b).
It follows, Mr. Speaker, that your decision, insofar as it purported to permit the Bill to proceed upon a threshold calculated by reference to Members present and voting rather than the constitutionally prescribed two-thirds of the Members of Parliament, was contrary to the express command of section 108(2)(b).
The non-applicability of Section 94 (2) in relation to extra-constitutional decisions by Parliament or the Speaker
Mr. Speaker We are equally concerned about your reliance and reference to the provisions of section 94(2) of the 1991 Constitution during the referenced parliamentary sitting, which provides, inter alia,
”that no decision, order or direction of Parliament, its Committees or the Speaker relating to the rules of procedure of Parliament, or to the application or interpretation of such rules, shall be inquired into by any Court.”
With respect, section 94(2) does not confer constitutional infallibility upon parliament and should be discountenanced by the Supreme Court in dealing with any application seeking to nullify the purported constitutional amendment. Its protection is directed at decisions concerning the internal rules and procedures of Parliament and the application or interpretation of those rules.
There is therefore a fundamental distinction between a decision interpreting Parliament’s rules of procedure and a decision purporting to determine the meaning of the Constitution. The latter cannot be converted into an internal parliamentary matter merely because the constitutional question arose during proceedings in Parliament.
This distinction is reinforced by APC & Others v Speaker & Others CIL-APP/(2000), where the Court of Appeal rejected an expansive reliance upon section 94(2). Tolla Thompson JA emphasized the imperative nature of the applicable requirements and the consequences of non-compliance. This authority demonstrates the important constitutional principle that parliamentary autonomy does not amount to parliamentary sovereignty. Parliament and the Speaker remain subject to the Constitution from which their respective powers are derived.
With the greatest respect to your distinguished Office, a decision of the Speaker cannot rewrite the Constitution from the Chair. Neither can section 94(2) elevate such a decision above the Constitution from which the Office of Speaker itself derives its authority.
The Supreme Court of Sierra Leone
Respectfully, if there existed sufficient uncertainty as to the proper construction of sections 91(1) and 108(2)(b) to warrant the authoritative intervention of the Supreme Court, that uncertainty necessarily existed before the vote was taken. The prudent constitutional course would have been to obtain that interpretation before permitting Parliament to proceed upon a disputed construction of the Constitution, rather than first allowing the Bill to be purportedly passed and thereafter seeking judicial interpretation of the very constitutional requirement upon which its passage depended.
The intended reference cannot retrospectively alter the constitutional position obtaining at the time of the vote. It cannot supply votes which were not cast, alter the number of Members against which the constitutional threshold was required to be calculated, or cure a failure to attain that threshold. The constitutional requirement was either satisfied when the vote was taken or it was not.
Accordingly, where the constitutionally prescribed majority was not attained, the purported passage of the Constitution of Sierra Leone (Amendment) Bill 2025 cannot properly be characterized as a mere procedural irregularity. The defect goes to the very constitutional authority of Parliament to pass the Bill. Your decision permitting the Bill to proceed upon the lesser threshold was therefore, respectfully but firmly, unconstitutional, null and void, and the purported passage of the Bill founded upon that decision is equally null, void and of no legal effect.
We are mindful that you have since indicated referral to the Supreme Court for interpretation. We are also mindful of statements and intentions by other interested parties of approaching the Supreme Court for a declaration of invalidity of the purported constitutional amendment.
Respectfully, whether referral for interpretation or declaration of invalidity. The Supreme Court can only arrive at a single conclusion that the constitutional amendment is unconstitutional and of no legal effect. Whether the Court applies the literal or purposive approach, the constitutional text admits of only one conclusion: the special threshold prescribed by section 108(2)(b) cannot be displaced by the general voting provision in section 91(1).
The purported Constitutional amendment has no legal validity and the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone should so declare once it is seised of the matter.
This is our respectful position.
FIAT JUSTITIA RUAT CAELUM
YOURS FAITHFULLYMELRON C. NICOL-WILSON ESQ
NICOL–WILSON & CO.
(Malaika Chambers)
Cc: The Honourable Chief Justice of the Republic of Sierra Leone
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